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1JURIDICAL DISCOURSE AND EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
Atahualpa Fernandez
Abstract: This article propose an explanation about Law  that crosses the scales of space,  time and complexity to, by 
uniting the apparently irreconcilable facts of the social and the natural, integrate the perception of a normative 
network, of a social adaptive strategy, that certainly was created and exists in function of its contributions to survival 
and reproductive success during the long period of our evolutionary history, that is, to resolve recurrent evolutionary 
problems in an essentially social species such as ours that otherwise would not have managed to prosper 
biologically.
Human culture, and the law in particular, is a deposit of ethical, juridical and political 
precepts that include every type of specific order, value, prohibition, taboo and ritual.  Since the 
most remote times, students of law have tried to organize these imperatives in a universal 
rational, harmonic and defendable system of norms and principles, but nothing like a consensus 
has been achieved to date.  Mathematics and physics are the same for anyone and in any place, 
but the law (and ethics) still cannot reach a similar and considered equilibrium.
Why not?  Is this objective illusionary?  Is the law, after all, a subject of subjective taste 
(of political power)?  Are there no juridical truths that can be discovered and confirmed, that are 
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2not forced movements or merely serviceable truths1?  Great edifices of juridical discourse theory 
and methodology have been built that have been criticized and defended, submitted to vision and 
widened and by the best methods of rational investigation and among these artifacts of human 
thought figure  some of the most extraordinary creations of the juridical discourse culture.  
However, perhaps because they never paid proper attention to evolved human nature and to the 
structure and the material functioning of the human brain (for the instincts and the predispositions 
to create an exploit the relational social ties that are there and whose genesis should then be 
reintegrated in the evolutionary history of our species), continue without gaining an unconditional 
agreement of ideas and opinions of all those who have already studied them carefully.
It is not surprising then that exercising the law is one of the most problematic and publicly 
contested of all the jusphilosophical enterprises. It is not informed by anything that is recognizable 
as authentic theory in the natural sciences: neither law nor ethics have any sufficient verifiable 
cement of knowledge of human nature to produce predictions of cause and effect and just 
judgments based on them.
Indeed, the juridical discourse operators, when they approach the study of human 
behavior and the law, usually speak of diverse types of explanations: sociological, 
anthropological, normative, axiological and others, appropriate to the perspectives of each one of 
the respective disciplines and areas of knowledge, that is, without even considering the (real) 
possibility that there is only one class of explanation for understanding the jurisdiction in their 
methodological projection.
An explanation that crosses the scales of space,  time and complexity to, by uniting the 
apparently irreconcilable facts of the social and the natural, integrate the perception of a 
normative network, of a social adaptive strategy, that certainly was created and exists in function 
1In the in the very sharp observation by Dennet (1995), it is not “scientifism” to intend to give objectivity and precision 
to good science, in the same way this is not adoration of  history to think that Napoleon dominated France for a time 
and that the Holocaust really happened; those that fear the facts will always try to discredit those that find them.
3of its contributions to survival and reproductive success during the long period of our evolutionary 
history, that is, to resolve recurrent evolutionary problems in an essentially social species such as 
ours that otherwise would not have managed to prosper biologically.
If we focus, for example, on the standard models of juridical discourse, it can be said that 
they are insufficient, while: a) they do not take care or simply do not deal at all with the very 
important aspects of the problem of legitimization of the law from a previous conception of human 
nature (from its individual, separate and autonomous existence); b) they do not offer a method 
that permits, on the one hand, adequate analysis of our capacities, skills and limitations for the 
operation of the rational processes of juridical argumentation, or on the other hand, assess their 
results and impacts on what is referred to as our moral intuitions and emotions (both the culturally 
formed and especially the biological roots); and c) have a very limited interest (or hardly any) in 
the political context of facts or applicability of the proposals that they use as foundation2, while 
they are little  critical of the articulation modes and consequences of the relational social ties 
(communal sharing, equality matching, market pricing and authority ranking) through which 
humans construct approved styles of interaction and social structure, that is, the rights and duties 
that arise in evident community life3.
2In this instance, an institutional model designed from a Republican and Democratic conception seems to be the 
most suitable, not only because the Republican tradition can recognize plurality in the motivations of human social 
life - that certainly is an enormous starting advantage compared to motivational monism of the Liberal tradition -, but 
mainly because its particular use of an open ethical political model has values of citizenship and juridical political 
methodology essentially useful to take the law as an instrument of social construction and, very particularly, to 
assimilate the formal and material exchanges in the process of decision taking in the face of the fluid (and sometimes 
crazy) dynamics of the world of every day life.
3I refer to the idea suggested by Alan P. Fiske (1993) whose innovating proposal I followed not only because of it 
good form quality, but also because of its amazing empirical richness – that answers many of the questions about the 
way the dominion- specific organization of the human mind affects human relations and conditions our moral 
intuitions.  Based on a wide range of anthropological, sociological and psychological investigations, Fiske postulated 
the existence of four elementary forms of sociability, four elementary models by which man constructs approved 
styles of social interaction and social structure.  The four elementary models are 1) Communal sharing; 2) Authority 
ranking; 3) Market pricing; 4) Equality matching.  As these four structures are found very extensively in all cultures, 
and as they form part of the most important areas of social life, Fiske suggests as a possible inference that they are 
rooted in the structures of the human mind.  In this sense, since it seems unthinkable to treat the juridical relation 
(that is, the personal relationships of man that the juridical discourse identifies as such) without taking the 
relationships that are forged in the course of human existence as a reference, to know characteristics of the four 
types of social ties proposed by Fiske permits the discovery of powerful means of articulating these forms of social 
life.  And because all law and all order are relational in character, this is where, and the last analysis, the task of 
exercising with the law that, from a instrumental, pragmatic and dynamic perspective, comes to be conceived as an 
4In truth, any theoretical proposal of juridical discourse seems to be tendentiously destined 
to failure that intends to dissimulate or simply tries to forget the fact that all the argumentation that 
is carried out in juridical life is, basically, an argumentation about the various ways by which these 
(four) forms of social life are articulated rooted in the complex cognitive architecture of the human 
mind and  irreducible among themselves.
In other words, admitting that the immediately specific diffusion of the links of communal 
sharing, equality matching, market pricing and authority ranking takes place because they are 
incorporated in a necessary way in our cognitive architecture (therefore links that underlie the 
universal traits of the culture), is, undoubtedly, the safest way to discover powerful, fertile and 
linking ways (juridical) of explanation and articulation of human contact and of relational social 
ties especially a wide range of badly conduct badly adapted to the current circumstances: suitable 
ways of combining them, of enhancing and cultivating their best aspects, and of mitigating or 
judging their destructive and dangerous aspects4.
Thus the construction of a methodological proposal of juridical argumentation that takes 
into account the adequate ways of articulation of these relational social ties should lead, on the 
one hand to a greater and more direct approximation to the  argumentation theories that develop 
in other areas of scientific knowledge, notably those elaborated by the sciences of the brain, 
intent, a technique, to solve certain practical problems related to behavior in subjective interference of individuals 
(Kaufmann, 1999; Atienza, 2003).  It is definitely a way that leads to considering the law as argumentation, that 
assumes, uses and in a certain way, gives sense to the other theoretical perspectives related to the structural, 
sociological and axiological dimensions of the juridical phenomenon.
4 In this sense, because it permits facing the hypertrophies and hypotrophies of the different relational social ties: to 
the excesses and defects, that is, the relations of communal sharing, authority ranking, market pricing and equality 
matching and further the same social ties of equality in which the relationship of citizenship itself is inserted.  
Similarly, and equally, because it enables us to face the wearing away of a type of social tie by others: the anti-
accumulative and anti-reactionary restrictions to the use of power, for example, try to prevent the authority social ties
(the political power) from shaking the basis of community social life as the efficacy of freedom; the anti-alienating and 
anti-accumulative restrictions to use of private property, for example, seek to prevent the social ties of market pricing 
(the market) from shaking the basis of communal social life; the anti-alienating and anti-accumulative restrictions to 
the use of the right to suffrage, as we have seen, seek to prevent corruption of the citizen equality relationship by 
contagion of the market share ties.  And the famous “eternal citizen vigilance” (Republican) that seeks to prevent the 
abuse of authority on the part of the more deceitful and selfish breaks the links of citizen equality and degrades the 
conception of justice in banalizing the use of power to the service of spurious and unjustified political and/or 
economic interests.
5philosophy of the mind, evolutionary biology, primatology, evolutionist psychology, etc.; and on 
the other hand would oblige us to consider that every proposal of juridical argumentation not only 
has to develop in permanent contact with what is normally called the “theory of law” but also with 
a previous and very well-defined ontological, moral and political conception (liberal, republican, 
communist, etc.) about the human being.
To fulfill the essentially practical function of juridical  argumentation this should be 
capable of offering a useful orientation in the tasks of interpreting,  justifying, applying and 
producing the law, that is, based on the best data available on how human beings are, 
considered  from a very much more empirical stance and respectful of scientific methods –use it 
to make changes for the benefit of mankind.  And further that an evolutionary and biological 
perspective does not determine whether the exchange is adequate or which measures should be 
adopted to create a desired exchange, could certainly  serve to inform on a question of 
fundamental importance: can who “exercises the law” try to act in harmony with human nature or 
against it; but is probable that efficacious solutions would be reached by modifying the 
environment where human nature is developed rather than taking on the impossible task of 
altering human nature itself.
On the other hand, a proposal of juridical argumentation that can fulfill this function of 
instrumental character (directed to the practices of the law and to the cultivators of juridical 
dogma) will have to be equally capable of also offering a control method of rationality or 
reasonability of the interpretation and application procedure of the law, and a set of criteria or 
guidelines suitable to judge the moral and methodological correction in the formulation and 
conception on its the  “best decision” .
After all, only in man, in his individual, separate and autonomous existence, with his 
intriguing evolutionary history and an innate cognitive architecture (homogeneously structured 
and functionally integrated, regimented in modules or specific dominions), can the true rationality 
6of the Law always be found.  Hermeneutics and juridical argumentation are not a toy for an elite 
of logics, analysts or privileged jusnaturalists, but  construct a useful methodological tool to 
operationalize the necessarily “based”  pragmatic-normative measuring of the concrete exercising 
of the law. 
Similar to every cultural artifact or social adaptive strategy, the law is “there” because of 
man´s will (and not the contrary) and to solve adaptive problems concerning (fundamentally) our 
complicated life in society.  Thus the juridical operators, in the task of the historical and social 
exercise of the law, should be active and permanently committed to the question of to where they 
serve mankind, and very especially, to where the law serves to prevent the individual from 
arbitrary interferences from the other social agents in his life plans.
Afterwards, the hermeneutic activity itself is formulated  precisely from an anthropological 
position and puts in play a phenomenonology of human action; that from the point of view of man 
and his nature would it be possible for the juridical discourse operator to represent the sense and 
function of the law as a unit of a vital, ethical and cultural context: man, who lives from 
representations and significances that are processed in his brain structures, designed for 
corporation,  dialog and argumentation and that, in his “exist with” is situated on a certain 
historical-existential horizon, continually asks other people, whose emotions he internalizes, that 
justify the legitimacy of their choices using the reasons that underlie and motivate them.
Cultivating this better side of the law should mean today, more than an ever, not only 
taking responsibility in the face of man in the sense in ensuring his individual, free, separate and 
autonomous existence, but also legitimizing the right from the determination of, and respect for, 
his human nature.
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